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ASYMMETRICINFORMATION AND FINANCIAL CRISES:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the nature of financial crises from a historical
perspective using the new and burgeoning literature on asymmetric information
andfinancial structure. After describing how this literature helps to
understandthe nature of financial crises, the paper focuses on a historical
examination of a series of financial crises intheUnited States, beginning
with the panic of 1857 and ending with the stock market crash of October
19.1987.The asymmetricinformation approach explains thepatterns in the data
andmany features of thesecrises which are otherwise hard to explain.Italso
suggestswhy financial crises have had such important consequences for the
aggregate economy over the past one hundred and fifty years.
Frederic S. l'tishkin
Graduate School of Business
Uris Hall- -619
Columbia University
New York, N.Y. 10027I. INTRODUCTION
In recentyears there has beenagrowingconcemwith thefragility of the
financial system. Increasing defaults on junk bondsandthe stock market
crash of October 1987 have raised the specter of major financial crises which
might inflict severe damage on the economy. Folicymakers,particular[y those
in the central bank, are faced with the questions of what should they do to
prevent financial crises and what should be their response when a financial
crisis appears imminent. In order to start providing intelligent answers to
these questions, we must first understand what is the nature of financial crises
and how they might affect the aggregate economy.
This paper seeks to understand the nature of financial crises by
examining the history of financial crises in the United States using the new and
burgeoning literature on asymmetric information and financial structure,
which has been excellently surveyed recently by Gender (1988a). After
describing how an asymmetric information approach helps to understand the
nature of financial crises, the paper focuses on a historical examination of a
series of financial crises in the United States, beginningwith the panic of 1857
and ending with the stock market crash of October 19, 1987. The asymmetric
information approach explains the patterns in the data and many features of
these criseswhich are otherwise hard to explain. It also suggestswhy financial
crises have had such important consequences for the aggregate economy over
the past one hundred and fifty years.
II. THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL CRISES
There are twopolarviewsof the nature offinancialcrisesexistent in the
literature. Monetarists beginning with Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have
associatedfinancial crises with banking panics. They stress the importance of
banking panics because theyview them as a major source of contractions in the
money supply which, in turn, have lead to severe contractions in aggregate
economic activity in the United States. Their view of financial crisis leads
monetarists to advocate a central bank lender-of-last-resort role to prevent
banking panics so that monetary instability will be prevented. Monetarists do
not view events in which there is a sharp drop in wealth but there is nopotential for a banking panic and a resulting shaip decline in the money supply
as real financial crises that require any central bank intervention. Indeed,
Schwaitz (1986) characterizes these situations as "pseudo fmancial crises".
Central bank intervention in a pseudo-fmancial crisis is unnecessaiy and can
indeed be harmful since it leads to a decrease in economic efficiency because
firms that deserve to fail are bailed out or because it results in excessive
money growth that stimulates inflation.
An opposite view of financial crises is held by Kindleberger (1978) and
Minsky (1972) who have a much broader defmition of what constitutes a real
financial crisis than monetarists. In their view, financial crises either involve
shaip declines in asset prices, failures of both large fmancial and nonfinancial
firms, deflations or d is i nfl at ions, disniptions in foieign exchange markets, or
some combination of all of these. Since they perceive any of these distur-
bances as having potential serious consequences for the aggregate economy,
they advocate a much expanded role for government intervention when a
fmancial crisis, broadly defmed, occurs.
One problem with the Kindleberger-Minsky view of financial crises is
that it does not supply a rigorous theory of what characterizes a financial
crisis, and it thus lends itself to'being used too broadly as a justification for
government interventions that might not be beneficial for the economy.
Indeed, this is the basis of Schwartz's (1986) attack on the Kindleberger-
Minsky view. On the other hand, the monetarist view of financial crises is
extiemely narrow because it only focuses on bank panics and their affect on
the money supply. The recent literature on asymmetric information and
fmancial structure, on the other hand, does piDvide a broader view of the
nature of flnancialcrises, but it supplies a theoiy which does not automatically
justify government interventions when their is a shaip dn)p in wealth as the
Kindleberger-Minsky view might.
The asymmetric information literature which looks at the impact of
financial structure on economic activity focuses on the differences in
information available to different parties in a financial contract. Borrowers
have an informational advantage over lenders because borrowers know more
about the investment piDjects they want to undertake than do lenders. This
informational advantage leads to adverse selection and a classic "lemons"
problem first described by Ackerloff (1970). A lemons problem occurs in the
debt ma±et because lenders have trouble determining whether a lender is a
good risk (he has good investment opportunitieswith low risk) or, alternative -3
lyis a bad risk (he has poorer investment projects with high risk), if the
lender cannot distinguish between the borrowers of good quality and bad
q u ality (the lemons) he wifi only make the loan at an interest rate that reflects
the average quality of the good and bad bonowers. The result is that high-
quality borrowers will be paying a higher interest rate than they should
because low-quality borrowers pay a lower interest rate thanihey should. One
result of this lemons problem is that some high-quality bonowers may drop
out of the market and so profitable investment projects that should be
undertaken will not be.'
Another result, as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), is that
infoimation asymmetry can lead to credit rationing in which some bonowers
are arbitrarily denied loans. This occurs because a higher interest rate leads
to even greater adverse selection: the borrowers with the riskiest investment
projects will now be the likeliest to want to take out loans at the higher
interest rate. if the lender cannot discriminate who are the bonowers with the
riskier investment projects, he may want to cut down the number of loans he
makes, which causes the supply of loans to decrease with the higher interest
rate rather than decrease.' Thus, even if there is an excess demand for loans,
a higher interest rate will not be able to equilibrate the market because
additional increases in the interest rate wifi only decrease the supply of loans
and make the excess demand for loans increase even further. Indeed, as
Mankiw (1986) has demonstrated, a small rise in the riskiess interest rate can
lead to a very large decrease in lending and even a possible collapse in the
market.
The adverse selection-lemonsanalysis above indicates howadisruption
can occur in financial markets that adversely affects aggregate economic
activity. If market interest rates are driven up sufficiently because of
increased demand for credit or because of a decline in the money supply, the
'The lemons problem also can be important in equity markets. Myers and Majluf (1984) and
Greenwald,Stiglitzand Weiss (1984) describe how the inabffity of investors to distinguish
betweengoodand bad issuers of equity means that the price they will pay for shares will reflect
the average quality of the issuers. The result is that high-quality firms receive a lower price for
their shares than their fair market value, while low-quality firms receive a price above their fair
market value. As a result, some high-quality firms will not issue shares and so investment
projects with a positive net present value will not be undertaken.
*Asymmetric information can also explain credit rationing in which there are restrictions Ofl
the size of loans, as in Jaffee and Russell (1976).4
adverse selection problem might dramatically increase and there will be a
substantial decline in lending, which. in turn. leads to a substantial decline in
investment and aggregate economic activity.In addition, if uncertainty
increases in a financial market so it is now harder for lenders to screen out
good borrowers from bad borrowers, the adverse selection problem also
increasesdramaticallyand again can lead toasharp decline in investment and
aggregate activity.
These mechanisms suggest that an important manifestation of a
financial crisis would be a large rise in interest rates to bonowers for which
there is substantial difficulty in obtaining reliable information about their
characteristics, that is, for which there is a serious asymmetric information
problem. On the other hand, there would be a much smaller effect on interest
rates to borrowers for which there is almost no asymmetric information
problem because itis easy to obtain information about their characteristics.
Since low-quality bonowers are more likely to be firms for which information
about their characteristics isdifficult to obtain, while high-quality bonowers
are more likely to be ones for which the asymmetric information problem is
least severe, a rise in the spread between interest rates on low-quality versus
high-quality bonds can provide information on when the adverse selection
problem becomes more severe in debt markets.
One way that lenders can reduce the adverse selection problem in debt
markets is to have the borrower provide collateral for the loan. With
collateral, even if the bonower defaults on the loan, the lender wifi take title
to the collateral which can be sold to make up the loss. Thus if the collateral
is of good enough quality, then it is no longer as important whether the
bonower is of good or bad quality since the loss incurred by the lender if the
loan defaults is substantially reduced. The fact that there is asymmetric
information between the borrower and lender is no longer as important a
factor in the market.
Theimportanceofcollateralforreducingtheadverseselectionproblem
in debt markets provides another mechanism whereby financial disruption
adversely affects aggregate economic activity. As emphasized by Calomi ris
and Hubbard (1990) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988). a sharp decrease in
the valuation of firms' assets in a stock market crash lowers the value of
collateral and thereby makes adverse selection a more important problem for
lenders since the losses from loan defaults are now higher. Note that this
decline in asset values could either occur because of expectations of lowerftiture income streams from these assets or because of a rise in market interest
rates which lowers the piesent discounted value of ftituie income streams.
The lemons problem analysis indicates that the increased importance of
adverse selection will lead to a decline in lending and therefore a decline in
investment and aggiegate economic activity. Again we would expect that this
increase in the adverse selection problemwoulclaffect interest rates for lower
quality firms mole than it would affect inteiest rates for higher quality firms
for which there is better information about their characteristics. Hence, it
would be manifested by an inciease in the interest rate spread for high versus
low quality borrowers.
Asymmetricinfoimafion between borrowers and lenders also iesultsin
a moral hazard problem which affects the efficiency of financial markets.
Because lenders have trouble in ascertaining the quality of investment
projects that borrowers undertake, the borrower has incentives to engage in
activities that may be personally beneficial but will increase the probability of
default and thus haim the lender. For example, the borrower has incentives
to cheat by misallocating funds for his own personal use, either through
embezzlement or by spending on perquisites which do not lead to incieased
profits (F. Ross Johnson, the foimer CEO of RJR-Nabisco is reputed to have
had RJR-Nabisco pay for two personal maids, two dozen country club
memberships, and a fleet of ten corporate planes nicknamed the "RJR
Airforce"). Also the borrower has incentives to undertake investment in
unprofitable projects that increases his power or stature, or to invest in
projects with higher risk in which the borrower does well if the project
succeeds but the lender bears most of the loss if the project fails. In addition,
the borrower has incentives to shirk and just not work very haiti. The conflict
ofinterest behveenthe borrower and lender (the agency problein)implies that
lending and investment will be at suboptimal levels. Indeed, as indicated by
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), a lower amount of a borrowers' net worth
increases the agency problem because the borrower has less to. lose by
engaging in moral hazard. Hence, a decline in borrowers net worth leads to
a decrease in lending, and thus a decline in investment and aggregate
economic activity.
The agency and adverse selection problems provide additional
mechanisms for effects from financial crises on the aggiegate economy. An
unanticipated deflation or a disinflation redistributes wealthfrom debtors to
creditors by increasing the realvalue of debt and therebyreducingborrowers'6
net worth. The resulting increase in adverse selection andagencyproblems
causes a decline in investment and economic activity.' The presence of
asymmetric infoimation thus provides a rationale for Irving Fisher's (1933)
debt-deflationanalysisof depressionswhichpoints toadecreasingprice level
and increased real indebtedness as a major source of the economic contraction
during the Great Depression. In a multi-period context, Gertler (1988b)
shows that the concept of a borrower's net worth can be broadened to include
the discounted valueoffuture profits. Thus a stock market crash which
represents a decreased valuation of firms' discounted future profits also
increases adverse selection and agency problems and can lead to a decline in
investment and a business cycle contraction.
Firms with high net worth and which have a high value of discounted
future profits, that is, high-quality fimis, are much less likely to have greatly
increased agency costs (costs due to asymmetric information in the market)
when a stock market crash or a deflationary shock occurs, while the opposite
is the case for low quality firms with low net worth and a low value of
discounted future profits. An increase in agency costs stemming from either
disinflation or a stock market crash, therefore, should also be reflected in a
rise in the interest rate spread for high versus low quality bonowers.
An important feature of the recent literature on asymmetric informa-
tion and financial structure is that it suggests why banks play a prominent role
in financial markets. Banks are eminently well suited to solve many of the
adverseselectionandmoralhazardproblemsinherentincreditmarkets. They
have expertise in information collection about firms and thus are better able
to screen good bonowers from bad borrowers at low cost. This is particularly
the case since they are not as subject to the free-rider problemwhich exists for
individual purchasers of marketable securities who can costlessly take
advantage of information that other purchasers of marketable securities
produce. Their advantages in information collection activities are also
enhanced by their ability to engage in long-term customer relationships and
to issue loans using lines of credit arrangements. They also can engage in
lowercost monitoringthanindividuals, as is demonstrated in Diamond (1984).
and also have advantages in enforcement of restrictive covenants, both of
Ca1omiris and Hubbard (1989) emphasize this mechanism in their econometric analysis of the
1894-1909 period.7
which reduce the potential for moral hazard by bonowers.' The existence of
asymmetric informationin credit markets provides a compelling rationale for
the importance of banks in getting funds from savers to bonowers who have
the most attractive investment opportunities, thereby enhancing economic
efficiency.
The importance of asymmetric information provides another mecha-
nism by which financial crises lead to reduced economic activity. The analysis
above indicates that banks perform an important role in generating productive
investment for the economy. Thus, as is described in Bernanke (1983),
disturbances in financial markets that reduce the amount of financial
intermediation that can be undertaken by banks, will lead to a reduction in
lending to bonowers with profitable investment opportunities and wifi result
in a contraction of economic activity.
Bank panics are clearly one major way in which banks may find
themselves unable to fully perform their intermediation role.' In a panic
depositors, fearing the safety of their deposits, withdraw them from the
banking system, causing a contraction in loans and a multiple contraction in
deposits. Here again an asymmetric information problem is at the source of
the financial crisis because depositors rush to make withdrawalsfromsolvent
as well as insolvent banks since they cannot distinguish between them.
Furthermore, banks' desire to protect themselves from possible deposit
outflows leads them to increase their reserves relative to deposits, which also
produces a contraction in loans and deposits. The net result is that a bank
panic reduces the funds available to banks to make loans and the cost of
financial intermediation rises, causing a reduction iriinvestment and a decline
in aggregate economicactivity.
A bank panic also has the feature of decreasing liquiditywhichwffl lead
to higher interest rates. As we have seen before, this rise in interest rates
directly increases adverse selection problems in credit markets and also can
reduce the value of firms' net worth, which also increases adverse selection as
'In addition, as pointed out by Siiglitz and Weiss (1983) banks have an advantage in
minimizing moral hazard on the part of borrowers because banks can use the threat of cutting off
lending in the future to improve bonower' s behavior.
Credit controls, such as those imposed in 1980, or disintermediation arising out of depositrate
ceilings are another possible way in which banks may find themselves unable to fully perform
their intermediation role.8
well as agency problems. Thus, since bank panics have the secondary effect
of increasing adverse selection and agency problems in financial markets,
bank panics lead to economiccontraction through these channels as well. We
should then also expect to see that bank panics are associated with a larger
interest rate spread between higher and lower quality debt instruments.
The monetarist literature on the role of bank panics in economic
contractions adds an additional channel to how financial crises affect the
aggregate economy. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) document how bank
panics in the United States led to sharp contractions in the money supply as
a result of depositors movement out of deposits into currency and banks
movement out of loans into reserves. These contractions in the money supply
thenareseenasbeingresponsibleforsubstantialdeclinesineconomicactivity
and the price level.
The view in the recent literature on asymmetric information and its
impact on aggregate economic activity is complementary to the monetarist
view of the importance of bank panics. Indeed, the asymmetric information
approach provides a transmission mechanism for how a decline in the money
supply leads to a decline in aggregate economic activity. The deflation that
stems from a decline in the money supply increases adverse selection and
agency problems which cause a decline in investment and aggregate economic
activity. However, the asymmetric information approach suggests that the
impact of a decline in the money supply as a result of a financial crisis is not
the whole story of why financial crises affect the aggregate economy. Instead
it takes a much broader view of what a financial crisis is and puts a very
different light on when a financial crisis is real rather than a pseudo-crisis.
III. A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
PRE WORLD WAR II FINANCIAL CRISES
To obtain evidence on how we should characterize financial crises. we
examine a series of episodes in the 1857 a1941period in which it is clear that
financial crises occurred. Then in rhe next section we will examine two
postwar episodes where there was Federal Reserve intervention to prevent a
financial crisis.9
The analysis in the previous section suggests that a critical variable for
assessing the nature of a particular financial crisis is the spread between
interest rates for high and low-quality bonowers. For the period beginning in
1919, the analysis uses the spread between Moody's Baa corporate bond rate
and the long-term Treasury bond rate averaged over the month. the same
spread variable used by Bernanke (1983). This variable is denoted as
SPREADB. However, since this series is not available before 1919, another
alternative measure must be used before that date. Macaulay (1938) provides
monthly yield data for high-grade railroad bonds from 1857 to 1935 which are
essentially averages over the month--they are calculated from the average of
the high and low bond price for that month. The spread measure was
constructed from this data by subtracting the average yield on the best one-
fourth of the bonds from the average yield on the worst one-fourth of the
bonds. (I.e., three bonds in the best and worst categories were used for 1857
to 1866, five bonds from 1867 to 1881, eight bonds from 1882 to 1887. and ten
bonds from 1888 to 1935.6) One-fourth as the fraction of bonds in the best and
worst categories was chosen because this fraction led to the highest conela-
tion of the Macaulay spread variable with the Bernanke spread variable in the
1919 to 1935 period when the two series overlap. However, the effect of the
choice of the fraction of bonds to include in each category is not crucial. The
conelation coefficient between Macaulay spread variables using a different
choice for the number of bonds in each category is always above .95 in the 1857
to 1918 period, and the conclusions for each episode studied are not affected
by a different choice for the number of bonds in each category.
The Macaulay spread variable has several problems in comparison with
the Bernanke spread variable. First, there is no guarantee in the Macaulay
variable that the worst or the best bonds remain in the same rating class
throughout the time period studied. This cannot be helped because bond
ratings for these bonds are not available. It should also be realized that the
Bernanke spread variable is not perfect on these grounds either because, as
Temin (1976) points out, during periods when default risk was changing
rapidly, it is not clear that the Moody's ratings continued to have the same
'Note that the dates when the number of bonds in each category changes do not fall within any
of the subsamples analyzed in the paper. This avoids the potential for any discootinuities in the
interest rate spread series during the episodes studied.10
meaning. Another potential problem is that the Macaulay bonds are all of
fairly high grade: In the 1919 to 1935 period the worst Macaulay bond still has
an interest rate below the Moody's Baa corporate bond rate, while the best
bond has a rate below the Aaa corporate bond rate. There is a possibility that
the MacaWay bonds might not have a sufficient difference in their grades to
pick up the changes in the interest rates for high and low-quality bonowers.
Despitetheselimitations,the Macaulay measure seems to perform we 1!.
The Macaulay spreadvariable, denoted as SPREADM, is plotted for the 1857
to 1918 period in Figure 1, Panel A. Panel B plots the Bernanke spread
variable, denoted as SPREADB, over the 1919 to 1988 period along with the
MacaWay variable from 1919 to 1935. As is visible in Panel B, the Macaulay
variable is highly correlated with the Bernanke variable: the correlation
coefficient between the two variables over the 1919 to 1935 period is 0.88.
Both tell similar stories in that period: they both rise during the 1920-21
recession, decline thereafter to a low point in the late twenties, climb
dramaticallywith the onset of the banking panics in late 1930, and then fall to
substantially lower levels by the end of 1935. Furthermore, as we will see, the
MacaWay spread variable seems to have a consistent relationship with stock
market and commercial paper rate variables in the pre-1919 episodes studied
below, adding further confidence in its validity.
The analysis of the nature of financial crises in the previous section also
suggeststhatweshouldlookatstockpricesandinterestrateswhenwe analyze
the individual episodes of financial crisis. The level of stock prices, denoted
as STOCK, is constructed as the cumulative geometric sum of the stock market
return series from Wilson, Sylla and Jones (1 99O), and is thus meant to be an
end of month series. However, the earlier data in the stock market series (up
until the 1920s) are made up of montMy averages or the averages of the high
and low stock prices for the month. Thus even though the stock price series
used here is meant to be thought of as an end of month series, it is actually
closer to a montffly average up until the 1920s. Furthermore, up until 1890,
the stock price series is primarily made up of railroad stocks.
The interest rates examined are those on high grade commercial paper,
denoted by RCP, and those on call loans to stock and bond brokers in New
York, denoted by RCALL. For the period 1857 to 1918, the commercial paper
"The stock price series developed by Schwert (1989b) is very close to that of Wilson, Sylla and
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rateseries is choice 60-90 day two name paper from Macaulay (193 S), while
after this date it is the rate on 4-6 month commercial paper obtained from
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-!94Q and 1941-1970, arid from the
Federal Reserve Bulletin of various years. The call loan rate series is taken
from Wilson, Sylla and Jones (1990) and it along with the commercial paper
rate series are montMy averages of daily rates. In the analysis of the financial
crises to follow, more attention will be focused on the commercial paper rate
when discussing interest rate movements. This makes sense because
commercial paper rates should be closer to the interest rates that affect
business firms' decisions to invest, while call loan rates are influenced by
peculiarities of events in the stock market
There are clearly many other variables that we might want to examine
in order to better understand what is going on during financial crises --such
as business failures, the price level, commodity prices, industrial production,
to name a few. However, in this paper I will be conducting a more preliminary
analysisandwillonlybeexaminingfinancialmarketvariables.Infuturework,
I hope to be able to use such data to engage in a fuller treatment of the
financial crisis phenomenon.
Now that we understand the data we are looking at, we can turn to
discussion of particular episodes of financial crises. We wifi focus especially
on the timing of events and financialvariables during these episodes, because
the timing wifi enable us to distinguish between different views of the nature
of financial crises. The crises we wifi examine first are the pre-World War II
episodes that are most prominent in discussions by Sprague (1910). Kindle-
berger (1978), Bordo (1986), Gorton (1987) and Schwert (1989a)! Historical
descriptions of these episodes are found in Sprague (1910), Collman (193 1),
Smith and Cole (1935), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and Sobel(1968).
The Panic of 1857
The stock price, interest rate spread and commercial paper rate data for
the two-year period sunounding the panic in October 1857 are reported in
Figure 2. Panel A plots the Macaulay interest rate spread variable, denoted
'The financial crisis associated with the beginning of World War I in August 1914 is not
examinedbelow because thedataforthis period arc not availablefrom August to November 1914
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bySPREADM and the stock price index denoted by STOCK. The left-hand
vertical axisconespondsto the spread variable, while the right-handvertical
axis corresponds to the stock price index. The stock price index is normalized
to equal100 atits peak value. Panel B plots the commercial paper rate. In
both panels, the NBER date for the beginning of the 1857-58 recession. July
1857, is marked on the horizontal axis with an 'R', while the October 1857
date for the banking panic is marked by a "P". This general format is used in
the figures for the other episodes discussed later.
The interest rate spreadvariable alongwith the commercial paper rate
begins to climb beginning in July of 1857, three months before the banking
panic, while the stock market is falling from the beginning of the year. On
August 25. the Ohio Life Insurance &TrustCompany, a major financial
institution which had made substantial investments in western land and
railroads as well as in commodity ftitures, failed. This was then followed by a
major stock market crash in September and October. The market return of
14.46% in September and -15.26% in October were the tenth and eleventh
worst montMy returns tabulated by Wilson, Syila and Jones (1990) for their
entire sample period form January 1834 through August 1988. With the
failure of the Ohio Life & Trust Company, reserves began to be pulled from
New York and the first bank failures there occurred in September. Interest
rates shot through the roof with the commercial paper rate rising to 18% in
September and a peak of 24% in October. Thinly capitalized railroads, such
as the Delaware, Lackawanna &Western,and the Fond du Lac and several
smaller railroads went bankrupt in September. Major runs on the New York
banks began in October, finally culminating in a suspension of specie
payments in mid-October, and bank panics spread throughout the country.
Failures of major railroads such as the Erie & Pittsburgh, the Fort Wayne &
Chicago, the Reading and illinois Central occurred in October. The outcome
was a severe recession which ended in December 18.58.
The timing of events in the panic of 1857 seem to fit an asymmetric
information interpretation of the financial crisis. Rather than starting with
the bank panic in October 1857, the disturbance to the financial markets
seems to arise several months earlier with the rise in interest rates, the stock
market decline, a major failure of a financial firm and the widening of the
interest rate spread. The asymmetric information story provides an explana-
don of how the financial crisis could have led to a severe economic downturn.
The rise in interest rates and the stock market decline, alongwith the failure13
of Ohio Life & Trust Co. which increased uncertainty, would magnify the
adverse selection andagencyproblems in the credit markets. Indeed, the stock
market crash might belinkedto the general rise in interest rates w h c f-i E owe rs
rhe present discountedvalue of future income streams. In this case, the panic
of 18.57 can beviewedas a liquidity crisis. Thenet result from the increase in
adverse selection and agency problems is that investment activity and
aggregate economic activity would decline causing expectations of further
economic contraction and business failures.
As pointed out in Gorton (1987). depositors would now want to
withdraw their funds from the banking system because the bleak business
conditions would leadthemto expectlosses ondeposits left in the banks,and
thiswouldbeespecially undesirable at a time when their consumption might
befaffingbecause of the economic downturn. The outcome of the process
would be a run on the banks and the resulting panicwould raise interest rates
further, cause the stock market to decline even more and worsen agency and
adverse selection problems even more in the credit markets. That a severe
economic contraction would develop is a logical outcome of this process.
Finally, after suspension of specie payments. the intervention of
clearing house associations, as is pointed out in Gorton (1985), helped to
separate out solvent from insolvent banks.' The banking panic would then
subside, and with the restoration of liquidity in the banking system, interest
rates would fall, the stock market might undergo a recovery, and if economic
uncertainty and deflation were not too severe, agency and adverse selection
problems would diminish, leading to a decline in the interest rate spread
variable and setting the stage for an eventual recovery of the economy. This
scenario seems to describe the data and the events in the 1857-58 period quite
well.
A monetarist interpretation cannot explain these set of events as
effectively because it does not explain the timing of the events and the
financial variables: i.e.,it does not explain why the banking panic occurred
when it did and why the spread between interest rates for high and low-quality
bonowers rises dramatically before the panic and then declines after the panic
Ano(her important role of thc clearing house associations mentioned by Gorton (1985) is that
they would provide liquidity to the banking system by issuing clearing-house certificates during
a panic. However, the clearing house associations had not yet taken on this role in 857, but did
so in later banking panics.14
subsides. However, the asymmetric information story does not rule out
important consequences on aggregate economic activity from the decline in
the money supply that a banking panic produces. It just suggests that there is
more to the story of a financial crisis than its affects on the money supply.
The Panic of 1873
The data for the two year period spanning the banking panic of
September 1873 is found in Figure 3, Panels A and B. The format is identical
to that in Figure 2. Of all the panics studied in this paper, the panic of 1873
is somewhat unusual. First, it occurs before the business cycle peak, as can be
seen in Figure 3, and second,itwas apparently quite unpredictable since itwas
not preceded by a rise in the interest rate spread.
The initial disturbance for the panic seems to have originated with the
financial difficulties of the railroad sector. On September 8, 1873, the New
York Warehouse&Security Compaiiy, who had made substantial loans to the
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad as well on grain and produce, suspended.
This suspension was soon followed by the failure of the banking house of
Kenyon, Cox & Co. as a result of endorsements on $1.5 million of paper issued
by the Canada Southern Railroad. At the time neither of these failures were
considered to be of major importance, but they were soon followed by the
suspension of Jay Cooke & Co. on September 18, one of the most respected
and important financial institutions in the United States, and the suspension
of Fisk &Hatchthe next day. The collapse of Jay Cooke & Co. also stemmed
from financial difficulties in the railroad sector, specifically problems with its
loans to Northern Pacific Railroad which Jay Cooke controlled. With the
announcement of the Jay Cooke & Company failure, the stock market went
into a nose dive, with the result that September 18, 1873 was dubbed "Black
Thursday", and the decline in stock prices was over 7% in the month of
September. Immediately, runs began on the Fourth National Bank and the
Union Trust Company. By Saturday, September 20, both the Union Trust
Company and the National Bank of the Commonwealth had failed and a major
banking panic was in full swing. On the same day the New York Stock
Exchange took the unprecedented step of closing, not to reopen until
September 30. On September 20, the New York Clearing House began to
issue clearing-house loan certificates to its member banks, and the decision












Figure 3:The Panic of 1873






















days, suspension of specie payments spread nationwide. Only by the end of
October had banks almost fully resumed specie payments to depositors.
In Figure 3. Panel A, we see that the spread between interest rates on
high and low-quality bonowers jumped in the month immediately following
the banking panic and stock market crash. We also see in Panel B that interest
rates began to rise one month before the crash, and thus the higher interest
rates may have been one source of increased adverse selection and agency
problems that helped cause the panic. However, the abruptness of the panic
suggests that major failures of financial firms such as Jay Cooke & Co. may
have increased informational uncertainty, depressed the value of net worth
relative to liabilities, and thereby increased adverse selection and agency
costs. The runs on banks which occuned immediately after the failure of Jay
CookeCo. reduced the ability of the banks to perform their intermediation
role and are another potential factor in inducing an investment decline and a
general economic contraction, which began, according to the NBER dating,
in November 1873.
Again the sorting out process of insolvent from insolvent banks and
insolvent from solvent business firms after the panic would reduce infoima-
tional uncertainty. The decline in interest rates and the recovery of the stock
market after November 1873, would also help reduce adverse selection and
agency problems. Consistent with this view, the spread variable does decline
immediately after November 1873. However, in contrast to the 18.57 episode,
the spread variable begins to rise in 1874, and for the last half of 1874 and all
of 1875 is at levels near the peak value reached in October and November of
1873. The high values of the interest rate spread in 1874 and 187.5 are
explained by the substantial deflation that sets in after the 1873 panic. As we
have seen, a sharp deflation transfers wealth from borrowers to creditors
which causes a deterioration in business firms' net worth. The resulting
increase in asymmetric information problems, which is reflected in the rise in
the interest rate spread, can thus be a major propagation mechanism during
the recession." The recession which began in November 1873 was especially
long lived, and, according to NBER dating, did not end until March 1879. It
is often considered to be one of the more severe economic contractions in U.S.
history, and by some writers is categorized as being the second most severe,
°A similar phenomenon can also affect consumer spending, as is discussed in Mishkin (1978).16
onlyto be outdone by the Great Contraction of 1929-33.
The datainFigure 3 is quite consistentwith an asymmetric information
interpretation of the 1873 panic and the severe recessionfollowing. However,
it gives a prominent role to the bankingpanicand affectson the economyfrom
declines in the money supply. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963) point out the
period from 1873 to 1879 has an unusual number of years in which declines in
the money supply occur. These declines in the money supply were likely to
have been an important factor in the decline in aggregate demand in this
period. The resulting extraordinary and prolonged deflation of the periodwas
then likely to have been an important factor in the rise of asymmetric
information problems because of the resulting deterioration in firms balance
sheet positions, which further encouraged a contraction in aggregate
economic activity.
The Panic of 1884
We will devote somewhat less discussion to the panic of May 1884
because it was not a particularly severe crisis. However, the patterns in the
data in Figure 4 around the panic date are very similar to the patterns we see
in other financial crises. A recession had begun in April 1882, well before the
panic, and the interest rate spread variable had been declining with the
exception of one large upward blip toward the beginning of 1884. With the
decline of stock prices after February 1884, the spread variable again begins
to rise. Then, as Sprague (1910) puts it, "Within little more than a week an
astonishing series of instances of fraud and defalcation, unexplained in our
history,were brought to light"" On May 8, the firm of Grant & Ward, in which
the son of Ulysses S. Grant was a major partner,failed. When audited the firm
was found to have assets of only $67,174 and liabilities of $16,792,640. The
Marine NationalBank,whose president, James D. Fish, was a partner in Grant
& Ward, failed immediately when it came to light that the bank had ifiegally
certified one of Grant & Ward's check for $750,000. On May 13, it became
known that John C. Eno, the president of the Second National Bank had
absconded with over $3 miffion of the bank's securities. The next day, the
ttspraguc (1910),page110. For those who like myself do not know the meaning of the word
defaIcationA, it means a misappropriation of funds held by a trustee or other fiduciary.Figure 4:ThePanic of 1884
Panel A: Stock Prices and the Interest Rate Spread
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Metropolitan National Bank closed its doors when it was learned that its
president, George Seney, had used bank funds to speculate in railroad stocks
which had declined precipitously in value. On the morning of May 16, A.W.
Dimock & Co. failed, while in the afternoon Fisk & Hatch (whichwas able to
reopenafter thepanicof 1 73) followed suit, takingdownwithitseveralbanks
connected with the firm.
The conditions seemed ripe for a full-scale panic, and we see in Panel
A of Figure 3 the typical pattern associated with a panic of a sharp increase in
interest rates, especially for call loans, a sharp decline in stock prices (over
8% in May). and a sharp rise the interest rate spread. However, a panicofthe
1873 magnitude was avoided by the timely action of the New York Clearing
House Association. On the afternoon of May 14, the New York Clearing
House met and approved the issue of clearing house certificates to the
Metropolitan National Bank. The bank was thereby enabled to resume
operations the next day and was reorganized with a new president. In
addition. the Second National Bank was able to meet all payments because the
father of the bank's president repaid the funds stolen by his son. The net
result was that the bank panic subsided and there was no general suspension
of specie payments in the banking system. In the aftermath of the financial
crisis, we see the usual pattern that interest rates decline along with the
interest rate spread. We also see a pattern that was found after the 1873
panic: the interest rate spread rose again after the decline immediately
following the panic. The continuing deflationwhich caused a deterioration of
firms' balance sheet positions and continuation of the recession which
increased uncertainty help explain this rise in the interest rate spread.
The Panic of 1890
The panic of 1890, like that of 1884, was on'y a minor crisis, in large part
because of the swift action by the Clearing House Association. In Figure 5,we
see the usual pattern of stockprices, the interest rate spread and interest rates
before the panic in November 1890. Interest rates begin to rise and the stock
market begins to fall several months before the panic, and at the same time
the interest rate spread begins to widen. On November 7, the Bank of England
raised its discount rate from five to six percent which created concern in the
New York money market. Heavy selling in the London stock market on
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and at 2 P.M. the failure of Decker, Howell & Co. was announced, which also
involved the Bank of North America. The Clearing House Association then
immediately decided to issue clearing-house certificates, although this action
did not become known until after the close of business on the eleventh,
Although the next thy the brokeragefirmof J.C. Walcott & Co. suspended and
the North River Bankclosed, confidence was restored with the knowledge that
clearing-house certificates were being issued. When knowledge of Baring
Brothers & Co.'s failure in London reached New York early on November 15,
stocks fell sharply. However, despite almost thirty failures of brokerage
houses, a major panic was avoided. The rise in the interest rate spread was
quite small and by the end of Novemberwhen Wall Street recognized that the
Bank of England and a syndicate of bankers were providing support to the
London money market, stock prices were recovering. The banking system
weathered the panic nicely and was able to continue full payments of specie
to their depositors. After December, the commercial paper rate declined
along with the interest rate spread. The recession, which lasted until May
1891. remained a mild one.
The Panic of 1893
The panic of 1893, in contrast to the two previous panics of 1884 and
1890. was a severe one. As we can see in Figure 6, after the onset of the
recession in February 1893, interest rates rose and the stock market began to
decline. Business conditions were very unsettled and nonfinancial business
failures were substantial. Sprague (1910) reports that the number and the
amount of liabilities of mercantile failures in the period from January to July
1893 were unprecedented. In addition, deflation had set in at the beginning
of the year which was producing a deterioration in business firms' net worth.
Given the climb in interest rates and fall in stock prices, along with uncer-
tainty about the health of business firms and the deterioration in firms'
balance sheets, the adverse selection and agency problems began to increase
and the spread between interest rates on high versus low quality bonowers
began to rise, as is indicated by the increase in the interest rate spread
variable.
On February 26, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad went into
receivership, but more importantly on May 4 the stock market received word
of the failure of the National Cordage Co., a stock market favorite, and a stockFigure 6:The Panic of 1893
Panel A: Stock Prices and the Interest Rate Spread
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market crash ensued. At this stage of the crisis, the New Yorkbanks appeared
to be weathering the crisis. However, banks in the West and the South. who
were burdenedwith many problem loans, began to face bank runs and in June
this led to substantial withdrawal of funds by these banks from the banks in
New York.Althoughthe waveof bankfailureswassubsiding by the beginning
of July, a second wave of panic hit thewestern and southern banks in the third
week of July. On July 25,theNew York,LakeErie & Western Railroad and
theWisconsin Marine & Fire Insurance Company suspended and there was
another sharp drop in the stock market. The bank panics in the South and
West, the resultingwithdrawals by these banks from the New York banks, and
theloss of confidence in the New York banks meant that they too would
succumb to the crisis despite provisions by the Clearing House Association to
issue loan certificates early on. Finally, by the beginning of August there was
a general suspension of specie payments to bank depositors.
The contraction of lending by the banking system as a result of its
troubles reduced its role in solving adverse selection and agency problems and
clearly made these problems worse in the financial markets. The seriousness
of these asymmetric information problems is reflected in the high values of the
interest rate spread variable in Panel A, which peaked in August 1893. Our
asymmetric infoimation analysis indicates that the events of the 1893 panic
were then amajorfactor in the very severe economic contraction that occurred
from February 1893 to June 1894. Sobel(1968) reports that besides the over
600 bank failures as a result of the panic (five percent of American banks).
there were over 15,000 commercial bankruptcies which included such
prominent railroads as the Northern Pacific, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe, and the New York & New England.
The 1896 Panic
Little seems to be written about the panic of 1896, but since Gorton
(1987) includes it in his listing of bank panics, the data surrounding his date
for the panic in October 1896 is reported in Figure 7. The data show the
typical patterns found in the other panics. Interest rates rise and stock market
prices fall several months prior to the panic date, and as our asymmetric
information story indicates, there is also a rise in the interest rate spread
variable. After the panic subsides, interest rates and the interest rate spread
fall, while stock prices recover. Another typical pattern is that the panicFigure 7:The Panic of 1696
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occursafter the onset of the recession in January 1896, which ends in June
1897. Both the panic and the recession are mild ones, and there is no
suspension of specie payments as in the panic of 1893.
The Panic of 1907
The panic of October 1907 was one of the more severe panics discussed
in this paper. The traditional story about the beginning of this panic, for
example in Sprague (1910), Collman (1931). Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
and Sobel (1968), emphasizes the difficulties of a group of banks associated
with F.A. Heinze, C.F. Morse, and E.R. and O.F. Thomas, who used them to
financetheir speculative activities. Their grand scheme was to establish a
corner in the United Copper Company, which they owned, and to make a
killing by squeezing the short sellers. When they suffered large losseswith the
collapse of the corner on Monday, October 14, the eight banks associatedwith
their activities came under suspicion and were forced to seek assistance from
the New York Clearing House Association during that week. By Monday,
October 2 1, the Clearing House had appeared to put the affairs of these banks
in order, when it was learned that the president of the Knickerbocker Trust
Company, the third largest trust company in New York, was involved with
Morse's investment activities. The distrust of Knickerbocker Trust resulted
in unfavorable clearing balances and the National Bank of Commerce
announced that it would no longer continue to clear for Knickerbocker Trust
on the following thy, October 22.TheClearing House Association did not
extend assistance to Knickerbocker Trust, and this is generally viewed as
having been a serious mistake. The ensuing run on Knickerbocker Trust
forced the bank to close its doors on October 22. The following thy, a run
began on the second largest trust company, the Trust Company of America,
and on October 24, the Lincoln Trust Company was also subjected to a run.
Althoughthese trust companieswere provided with assistance, the steps taken
were too slow and were not sufficiently dramatic to restore confidence, as
Sprague (1910) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) indicate. The stock market
crashed on October 24 and the monthly return for October 1907 was -10.9%
the thirty-first largest negative return for the 1834-1988 period documented
by Wilson, Sylla and Jones (1990). With the assistance of J.P. Morgan, $35
miffionwas raised by the end of the week to assist the Trust Company of
America and the bank panic in New York seemed to be under control. By now,21
however.fear had spread throughout the United States, and country banks
withdrew large amounts of funds from their New York conespondent banks.
Only when the situation was grave for the New York banks did the Clearing
House Association finally issue clearing-house loan certificates on October
26. This action was too late because the New York banks still suspended
payments of specie to depositors and the suspension of specie payments then
spread nationwide. Payments of specie to depositors was not resumed until
the beginning of January 1908.
The traditional story about the 1907 panic places much of the respon-
sibility on securities manipulation and inadequate action by the Clearing
House Association to prevent a major disruption of the banking system.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) view the substantial decline in the money
supply that followed the panic to have turned a mild recession into the severe
recessionextendingfrom June 1907 to June 1908. The data in Figure 8suggest
that there may be more to the story. The most striking feature of the data, as
can be seen in Panel A, is the substantial increase in the interest rate spread
variable that begins in early 1907, six months before the panic. Indeed, most
of the rise in the spread variable has already occuned by the time of the
October banking panic. As can be seen in Panel A, the banking panic
apparently raised the interest rate spread higher and helped prolong its high
values in the first half of 1908, but most of the rise cannot be attributed to the
bank panic itself.
The rise in the spreadvariable before the bank panic is easily explained
by our asymmetric information story. The stock market begins to decline
starting at the end of 1906, and the negative return in March of -9.8% is the
fortieth largest negative return in the 1834-1988 period. Before the panic
begins in October, the stock market has declined even further, by twenty-five
percent from its peak in late 1906. As we have discussed previously, the
decline in the valuation of firms by this substantial amount raises adverse
selection and agency problems for bonowing firms because it has in effect
lowered their net worth.
The onset of the recession in June 1907 before the panic, which raised
uncertainty about the quality of flims' investment projects, also increased the
adverse selection problem. In addition, the rise in the commercial paper rate
starting in June of 1907 from 5.4% to 6.8% by September, further worsened
the potential for adverse selection. The resulting increases in the degree of
asymmetric information problems, even before the October banking panic,Figure 8:T h e Panic of 1907


































Panel B: Interest Rates
PCALLJ22
should raise the spread between interest rates for high and low-quality
borrowers and hence the SPREADMvaj-jab[e. Indeed, since most of the rise
in the commercial paper rate and decline in the stock market has already
occuned before the onset of the panic. not surprisingly most of the rise in the
SPREAD Mv a r jab Ic has already occuned. The presence of severe asymmetric
information problems, even before the banking panic, suggests that they were
also potentially important factors in creating a severe business cycle
contraction. The decline in the money supply resulting from the bank panics
is almost surely another important factor in the severity of the contraction,
but the evidence here suggests that it is far from being the whole story.
The Great Depression Period
A majordifferencefor the Great Depression periodfromother periods
of financial panic analyzed above is the presence of the Federal Reserve
System. which began its operations in 1914. Although the Great Depression
is dated by the NBER as beginning in September 1929, the public always
associates the beginning of the Depression with the stock market crash of
October 1929. The outcome of the panic period starting October 23 and
culminating in the crash on October 29was a negative return for the month of
October of close to 20%. This was the largest monthly negative return in the
stock market up to that time. The data in Figure 9, however, indicate that
this financial panic differed substantially from those in previous periods.
Because of the large swing in the interest rate spread variable in the
1929-35 period, it is hard to discern its movements in the early phase of the
Great Depression in Panel A. Thus, an extra panel, Panel C, has been added
to Figure 9 that shows the stock price and interest rate spread data for the
1929-30 period. In the panels of Figure 9, 'C' marks the October 1929 stock
market crash, 'P1' the first banking panic of November 1930, "P2" he second
banking panic of March 1931, 'P3"Britain's departure from gold in September
193 1, and "PHI" the bank holiday of March 1933.
As we have seen in our analysis of previous panics, the usual pattern is
for a stock market crash to be accompanied by a sharp rise in both the level of
interest rates and the interest rate spread. Although in Panel C of Figure 9
there is some rise in the interest rate spread when the crash occurs, the
increase is fairly small. In addition, Panel B indicates that interest rates did







Figure 9:The Great Depression
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Although the stock market crash had such a great impact on the minds of a
whole generation, it does not appear to have developed into a full fledged
financial crisis as in the other episodes we have examined. The credit for this
development goes to the prompt action by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to provide reserves to the New York banks. During the panic period.
banks and lenders outside of New York rushed to liquidate their call loans to
brokers. In order to keep market conditions from getting more unsettled, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as described by its president, George L.
Harrison, kept its "discount window wide open and let it be known that
member banks might bonow freely to establish the reserve required against
the large increase in deposits resulting from the taking over of loans called by
others." In addition, the New York Fed made open market purchases of $ 160
million during this period, even though this amount was far in excess of what
was authorized by the Federal Reserve System's Open Market Investment
Committee.
In the aftermath of the New York Fed's action to provide sufficient
liquidity for the economy is a decline of the interest rate spread to levels
below those before the stock market crash and a continuing low level up until
October 1930. What is quite remarkable about the level of the interest rate
spread before October 1930 is that it remains so low despite the sharp
economic contraction up to that point and the over 40% decline in the value
of common stocks. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) state that, from the peak
in August 1929 through October 1930, industrial production fell 26%.
wholesale prices by 14% and personal income by 16%. The failure of the
interest rate spread to rise seems to indicate that asymmetric information
problems had not yet become severe in financial markets."
Just prior to the first banking panic in November-December 1930, the
interest rate spread begins to increase and reaches a temporary peak at the
height of the bank panic in December 1930. The first banking panic is
"Friedman and Schwartz (1963), page 339,
iSThe failure of the interest rate spread to rise also casts some doubt on the story put forward
by Ft omer (1988) that the initial severity of the Great Depression may have resulted from
increased uncertainty. Sincesuchuncertainty should increase adverse selection and thereby
increase the interest rate spread. and yet this does not seem to happen before October 1930, it
is not at all clear that uncertainty rose appreciably in this period.24
described by Friedmanand Schwartz (1963)asstartinginagriculturalregions,
where a "contagion of fear spread among deposit o rs' led to the failure of 256
bankswith S 180 miffion of deposits in November and the failure of 352banks
with over 372 million of deposits in December, including the failure on
December 11 of the Bank of United States with over $200 million in deposits.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) viewed the nature of the economic contraction
as changing at this stage. The continuing bank panics, which by the time of the
Banking Holiday in March 1933 had reduced the number of banks by over a
third, was the unique feature of the Great Depression period that they saw as
the force behind a steep but normal recession turning into the largest
economic contraction ever experienced in U.S. history.
An asymmetric information analysis of the Great Depression, first
outlined in Bernanke (1983), agrees with this view, but it does not see the
decline in the money supply resulting from the banking panics as being the
sole cause of the prolonged depression." Instead it sees the collapse of the
b ankingsystemaspreventingbanksfromengaginginfinancialintermediation
activities thatwould reduce asymmetricinformation problems. The resulting
increase in asymmetric information problems in credit markets led to a
decline in investment by those with otherwise profitable investment oppor-
tunities. Further, the debt-deflation in which the decline in prices transfers
resources from debtors to creditors and the continuing decline in the stock
market until the middle of 1932 led to a deterioration infirms'balance sheets,
which increased adverse selection and agency problems so that lending
decreased and hence investment fell. In addition, as pointed out by Mishkin
(1978) a similar deterioration in the balance sheets of consumers led them to
reduce their spending. A further effect could have come from the behavior of
real interest rates in this period. As is shown in Ivlishkin (1981), although
nominal interest rates on high-quality bonds fell during this period, real
interest rates climbed to exceedingly high levels during the 1931-33 period."
"Also see Hamilton (1987).
"Hamilton (1987) disputes the view that real interest rates were high during this period
because he finds that futures prices in commodity markets were not indicating an expected
deflation in this period. Mishkin (1990), Ii owever, demonstrates that fu Lures prices in comm othty
markets are not capable of informing us about expected inflation for aggregate price indices.
Cecchetti (1989) using additional evidence also criticizes Hamilton's position that the deflation
in this periodwasnotanticipated. More rccentwork by Hamilton (1990) is more favorable to the
view that real interest raLes rose during the 193 1-33 period. Indeed, an interesting finding in the25
The high level of real interest rates increased the adverse selection problem
in credit markets and is one further reason for a decline in investment
spending.
All of these effects helped make the Great Depression the most severe
in U.S. history. Consistentwith thisstory is the increase in the spread variable
to unprecedented levels. By the middle of 1932, the spread between interest
rates on corporate Baa and Treasury bonds had risen to above 7.5%, over 5
percentage points higher than the level before October 1930. Indeed1 it was
not until the end of 1936, that the spread variable falls to levels below those
found before October 1930. The fact that the spread between interest rates
for low versus high-quality bonowers remained so high for so long indicates
that asymmetric information problems were severe in this period. The
continuing severity of asymmetric information problems provides an
explanation for why the Great Depression was so prolonged.
The fact that aggregate output remained so far below its potential for
such a long period of time has always been a puzzle for neoclassical analysis.
Bernanke's (1983) documentation of the disruption of the credit markets
during the 193 1-35 period and the attendant asymmetricinformation problems
provides one explanation. An overlooked fact, however, is that another
financial crisis appears to have occurred in the 1937-38 period. From its peak
in February 1937 until its trough in March 1938, the stock market declined by
over 50%. Indeed, four of the largest fifty negative monthly returns in the
1834 to 1988 period tabulated by Wilson, Sylla and Jones (1990) are found in
this one year period. Indeed the stock market return of -23.9% in March 1938
is the second largest negative return (September 1931 is the largest with a
return of -29.3%). As we can see in Figure 10, which plots the data for the
1936-1941 period, there is another rapid run up of the interest rate spread,
which peaks in April 1938, one month after the stock market trough. Indeed
in the first half of 1938, the interest rate spread is back at the levels found in
1934. The large spread between interest rates on low and high-quality
borrowers suggests that asymmetric information problems were again
becoming major in the 1937-38 period, and this helps explain why the
economic contraction during this recession was so severe.
Hamilton paper is that substantial anticipated deflation and hence high real rates did not occur
until late 1930 and this is exactly when we start to see evidence that serious asymmetric











Figure 10:The 1936-41 Period
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The source of the difficulties in financial markets at this time is not
absolutely clear. The increase in reserve requirements in August 1936, March
1937 and May 1937 is one possibility, either through its effects on the money
supply which declined from March 1937 until May 1938. or by decreasing the
ability of the banks to extend loans because of their need to increase the ratio
of their reserves to deposits. Regardless of the cause, thefinancial disruption
in 1937-38 may help to explainwhy the U.S. economy did not really come out
of the shadow of the Depression period until World War II.
There is one last episode in the 1936-41 period depicted in Figure 10
that deserves some comment. May 1940 has a larger decline in stock market
prices than in October 1929. Indeed the negative return of -22.6% in May
1940 is the third largest monthly negative return in the 1834-1988 period.
Although the interest rate spread rises in May and June 1940. the magnitude
of the rise is very slight and it is also very temporary. The downward trend in
the spread variablewhich started afterApril 1938 continues after this episode,
leading to a spread below 1% by the end of World War II. This ifiustrates the
following important point: a stock market crash by itself does not necessarily
imDlv that a financial crisis has occurred. There is no evidence that there was
a serious disruption in financial markets after the May 1940 crashwhich could
have created difficulties for the economy.
An Overview of the Financial Crisis Episodes
Now that we have analyzed a whole series of financial crises, it is worth
asking what do they have in common and what does this tell us about the
nature of financial crises. The following facts emerge from our study of
episodes in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth.
1. With one exception in 1873, financial panics always occurred after
the onset of a recession.
2. With the same exception in 1873, stock prices decline and the spread
between interest rates on low and high-quality bonds rises before the
onset of the panic.
3. Many panics seem to havefeatures of a liquidity crisis in which there
are substantial increases in interest rates before the panic.
4. The onset of many panics follows a major failure of a financial27
institution, not necessarily a bank. Furthermore this failure is often
the result of financial difficulties experienced by a nonfinancial
corporation.
5.Therise in the interest rate spread associated with a panic is
typicallysoonfollowedby adedine. However, in several cases, most
notably after the 1873 panic. the 1907 panic and the Great Depres-
siOn,the interest rate spread rises again when there is deflation and
a severe recession.
6. Themostseverefinancialcrisesareassociatedwithsevereeconomic
contractions. The most severe panic episodes are in 1857. 1873,
1893, 1907 and 1930-33. while 1857-58, 1873-79. 1893-94, 1907-08,
and 1929-33 are all considered to be among the most severe
economic contractions.
7. Although stock market crashes often appear to be a major factor in
creating a financial crisis, this is not always the case. Both the stock
market crash in October 1929 and in May 1940 did not have
appreciable effects on the interest rate spread. Therefore, the
evidence that there was a serious disruption in financial markets
after these crashes is weak.
There axe several conclusions that can be drawn from the facts listed
above. The timing and the pattern of the data in the episodes studied here
seem to fit an asymmetric information interpretation of financial crises.
Rather than starting with bank panics, most of the financial crises begin with
a rise in interest rates, a stock market decline and thewideningof the interest
rate spread. Furthermore, a financial panic frequently is immediately
preceded by a major failure of a financial firm which increases uncertainty in
the marketplace. The increase in uncertainty and the rise in interest rates
would magnify the adverse selection-lemons problem in the credit markets,
while the decline in the stock market increases agency as well as adverse
selection problems, both of which are reflected in the rise in the spread
between interest rates for low and high-quality bonowers. The increase in
adverse selection and agency problems would then lead to a decline in
investment activity and aggregate economic activity.
Depositors would now want to withdraw their funds from the banking
system because the poor business conditionswould lead them to expect losses
on deposits left in the banks. The resulting bank panic would raise interest28
rates further, cause the stock market to decline even more and worsen agency
and adverse selection problems even more in the credit markets. This would
further encourage a severe economic contraction.
Finally, there would be a sorting out of solvent from insolvent firms by
bankruptcy proceedings and sorting out of solventfrom insolvent banks, often
with the help of publicauthorities and clearing house associations. The panic
would then subside, the stock market might undergo a recovery, interest rates
would fall, and if economic uncertainty and deflation were not too severe.
adverse selection and agency problems would diminish, leading to a decline
in the interest rate spread variable and setting the stage for an eventual
recovery of the economy. This process might get short circuited if a substan-
tial deflation sets in, leading to a debt-deflation process which transfers
resources from debtors to creditors, thereby leading to a deterioration in
business firms' net worth. The deterioration of firms' balance sheet position
would then lead to increased asymmetric information problems, reflected by
a continuation of a large spread between interest rates for low and hi gii -
qualityborrowers. Investment spending and aggregate economic activity
would then remain depressed for a prolonged period of time.
A monetarist interpretation of financial panics cannot explain the
events and their timing as effectively as the asymmetric information approach
because the monetarist view does not explainwhy the spread between interest
rates for high and low-quality bonowers rises dramatically before the panic
and then declines after the panic subsides. However, the asymmetric
information story does not rule out important consequences on aggregate
economic activity from the decline in the money supply that a banking panic
produces. It just suggests that there is more to the story of a financial crisis
than its affects on the money supply.
A monetarist explanation of financial panics is also not able to explain
the timing of banking panics, that is, why they occuned when they did. The
facts about the panic episodes discussed in this paper are entirely consistent
with Gorton's (1987)view that bank panics are predictable. His analysis also
depends on asymmetric information because he sees a bankpanicas occuning
as a result of the inability of depositors to evaluate the risk in individual bank
liabilities and so they cannot easily screen out good from bad banks. Hence
when aggregate information such as high interest rates, a major failure of a
corporation, or weak business conditions stemming from a recession occurs,
depositors wony about potential losses on their deposits and withdraw funds29
from the banking system, precipitating a panic. Gorton (1987) finds that
unanticipated changes in the liabilities of failed businesses is the best
predictive variable for the occurrence of a bank panic. The analysis in this
paper suggests that since stock market declines and widening of the interest
rate spread often precede bank panics, stock price and interest rate spread
variables, which were not used in Gorton's (1987) analysis. might also
appreciably help in the prediction of bank panics.
The successful intervention of the New York Clearing House Associa-
tion in the 1884 and 1890 episodes and the New York Federal Reserve Bank
during the October 1929 sto c k market crash illustrate how an effective lender-
of-last resort role can minimize the impact of a financial crisis on the
economy. We now turn to two postwar episodes of financial disturbances in
which the Federal Reserve actively performed this role even though the
banking system was not directly threatened.
IV. TWO POSTWAR EPISODES
OF FINANCIAL DISTURBANCES
The postwar period differs from the pre-World War II period in one
important respect. Since 1945. the banking system has not been subjected to
a banking panic and in no instance has there been a financial crisis that has
had serious adverse consequences for the aggregate economy. Examining
episodes of financial disturbances in the postwar period in which banking
panics were not an issue should be particularly instructive because the
monetarist interpretation does not view them as real financial crises.
However, if we do find that these financial disturbances have many of the same
patterns in the data as prewar financial crises and thus appear to exhibit the
potential for serious asymmetric information problems in credit markets, this
would lend additional support to the asymmetric information approach to
financial crises. Two episodes, the Penn Central bankruptcy of June 1970
and the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, are postwar examples of
financial disturbances in which banking panics were not an issue. In both
episodes the Federal Reserve activelyprovidedliquidity to a speeificfinancial
sector outside of the banking system and thus engaged in a broader lender-
of-last resort role.30
The Penn Central Bankruptcy
Prior to 1970, commercialpaperwas considered one of the safest money
market instruments because only corporations with very high credit ratings
issued it. It was common practice for corporations to continually r 01 over
their commercialpaper, that is, issue newcommercialpapertopayofftbe old,
Penn Central Railroad was a major issuer of commercial paper, with more
than $200 million outstanding, but by May 1970 it was on the verge of
bankruptcy and it requested federal government assistance from the Nixon
administration." Despite administration support for a bailout of Penn
Central, after six weeks of debate Congress decided not to pass bailout
legislation. Meanwhile, the Nixon administration asked the Board of
Governors to authorize a direct loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Fed to Penn Central. However, on Thursday, June 18, the New York Fed
informed the Board of Governors that its staff studies indicated that Penn
Centralwould not be able to repay the loan, and as a result the Board decided
not to authorize the loan. Without this loan, Penn Central was forced to
declare bankruptcy on Sunday, June 21.
Once the Federal Reserve made the decision to let Penn Centralgo into
bankruptcy, it was concerned that Penn Central's default on its commercial
paper would, as Brimmer (1989) puts it, have had a "chilling effect on the
commercial paper market" (p. 6), making it impossible for other corporations
to roll over their commercial paper. The Penn Central bankruptcy, then, had
the potential for sending other companies into bankruptcy which, in turn,
might have triggered further bankruptcies --leading to a full-scale financial
panic. To avoid this scenario, the New York Fed got in touch with a number
of large money center banks on Saturday and Sunday, June 20 and 21, alerted
them to the impending Penn Centralbankruptcy on June 22, encouraged them
to lend to their customers who were unable to roll over their commercial
paper, and indicated that the discount windowwould be made available to the
banks so that they could make these loans." Indeed, the banks did as they
'6Scc Maisel (1973)andBrimmer (1989) for further discussion of the Penn Central bankruptcy
episode.
"It is noteworthy that when the Fed advanced discount loans to banks lending to customers
who needed to role over their commercial paper, the banks were told that they would be
responsible for the credit risk involved in this lending. See Brimmer (1989), page 6.31
were told and made these loans, receiving as much as $575millionthrough the
discount window for this purpose. In addition, on June 22 the Fed decided to
suspend Regulation Qceilingson deposits of $100,000 and over in order to
keep short-term interest rates from rising, and the formal vote was taken the
next day to allow the FDIC and the FHLBB to take parallel action. The net
result was that the Federal Reserve provided liquidity so that the commercial
paper market would keep functioning.
The rationale for the Fed's action was that lenders would not be able to
screen out good bonowers in this market from bad bonowers. Was this
rationale plausible? The data in Figure 11 are suggestive that it was. Panel
A has the same format as previous figures, with the onset of the recession in
January 1970 marked with an "R', the Penn Central bankruptcy date marked
by a "P", and data on the stock market and the SPREADB interest rate spread
variable. Panel B contains data on the commercial paper rate and on the
interest rate spread between commercialpaper(4-6month) and thesix month
Treasury bill, denoted by SPREADC (replacing the rate on call loans, which
were no longer a major element in money markets).
The data in Panel A display the typical pattern that we saw for prewar
financial crises. The high level of interest rates reached in late 1969-early
1970 and the increase in uncertaintywith the onset of the recession in January
1970 are likely to have increased the adverse selection problem in the credit
markets. Furthermore, by May 1970 the stock market had declined over 35%
fromits peak value in November 1969. This decline in the valuation of firms
resulted in a decrease in net worth and further increased agency and adverse
selection problems in the credit markets. Consistent with the rise in
asymmetric information difficulties for the credit markets we do see a rise in
both of the interest rate spread variables, SPREADB (for long-term bonds)
and SPREADC (for commercial paper). Furthermore, despite the Fed's
actions we also see a jump in the interest rate spread variables at the time of
the Penn Central bankruptcy in June 1970. The fact that the spread between
interest rates on corporate Baa and Treasury bonds, rises along with the
commercial paper-Treasury spreadvariable indicatesthat the problems in the
commercial paper market did have a potential for spreading to other sectors
of the capital market. As we saw after other financial disturbances, the
interest rate spread does decline after the crisis, and this pattern is especially
pronounced for the commercial paper-Treasury spread variable in Panel B,
which returns to 1968 levels by the end of 1970. The SPREADB variable, onFigure II:The Penn Central Bankruptcy
Panel A: Stock Prices and the Baa—TBond Spread
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theother hand, continues to remain high for over two years after the Penn
Central bankruptcy. However, the increase in the SPREADB variable
resulting from the Penn Central bankruptcywas not large by the standards of
earlier financial crises. A major disturbance to the credit markets as a result
ofincreasedasymmetric information problemsseems to have beenavoided by
the Fed's willingness to perform its lender-of-last resort function.
The Stock Market Crash of October19,1987
Thecauses of the stock market crash are still being hotly debated, but
the biggest danger to the economy appears not to have come from the decline
in wealth resulting from the crash itself, but rather from the threat to the
clearing and settlement system in the stockandfutures markets.'* From the
peak on August 25, 1987 until October 16, just prior to the crash, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average had declined 17.5%. On Monday, October 19, the
market fell by 22.6%(asmeasured by the DMA) on record volume of 604
millionshares. Although October 19, 1987, dubbed "Black Monday", will go
down in history as the largest one-day decline in stock prices to date, it was on
Tuesday, October 20, 1987, that financial markets received theirworst threat.
In order to keep the stock market and the related index futures market
functioning in an orderly fashion, brokers needed to extend massive amounts
of credit on behalf of their customers for their margin calls. The magnitude
of the problem is illustrated by the fact that just two brokerage firms, Kidder,
Peabody and Goldman, Sachs, had advanced $1.5 billion in response to margin
calls on their customers by noon of October 20. Clearly, brokerage firms as
well as specialists were severely in needofadditional funds to finance their
activities. However, understandably enough, bankswere growingvery nervous
about the financial health of securities firms and so werereluctantto lend to
the securities industry at a time when it was most needed.
Upon learning of the plight of the securities industry, Alan Greenspan
and E. Gerald Cothgan, the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank
and the Fed official most closely in touch with Wall Street, began to fear a
breakdown in the clearing and settlement systems and the collapse of
securities firms. To prevent this from occuning, Alan Greenspan announced
"See tbe Wall Street burnal (1987) andBrimmer(1989) for a description of the events
surroundingthe stock market crash.33
beforethe market opened on Tuesday, October 20, the Federal Reserve
System's "readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic
and financial system." In addition to this extraordinary announcement, the
Fed encouraged key money center banks to lend freely totheirbrokeragefirm
customers, and, as in the Penn Central bankruptcy episode, made ft clear that
ft would provide discount loans to banks so that they could make these loans.
Again, the banks did as theywere told and by October 21 had increased by $7.7
billion their loans to brokers and to individuals to purchase or hold securities,
As a result, the markets keptfunctioning on Tuesday. October 20 and a market
rally ensued that day, raising the DJTA by over 100 points (over 5%). This
action by the Fed is reminiscent of the actions taken by the Fed during the
October 1929 panic period in which it provided liquidity to enable money
center banks to take over call loans which had been called by others.
The data for the period sunounding the October stock market crash arc
found in Figure 12. Panels A and B have the same format as those in Figure
11, while an additional panel, Panel C, has been added which contains weekly
data on interest spread variables for the six months sunounding the crash.
Panel C plots an additional series obtained from weekly issues of Barons.
the spread between interest rates on junk bonds (those with ratings below
Baa) and Treasury bonds.
The data in Figure 12 again display patterns seen in other financial
crises. The commercial paper rate had been rising for ayearbefore the stock
market crash because of the tight money policy followed by the Fed, while
stock prices began a decline over a month earlier. The evidence for increased
asymmetric information problems in credit markets before the crash, however,
is not particularly strong. The commercial paper-Treasury bifiinterest rate
spread variable, SPREADC, also had been rising for a year before the crash,
andyetthejunkbond-Treasuryand Baa•Treasury spreadvariables, SPREADJ
and SPREADB, did not rise until the stock market crash, when they i m -
mediatelyjumped.Not surprisingly, given that asymmetric information effects
should impact more on low quality bonowers than on high quality bonowers,
the junk bond-Treasury spread shows the largest jump. In the week of the
stock market crash, it jumped by 130 basis points (1.3 percentage points) and
rose another 60 basis points over the next two weeks. However, as usually
occursafterapanic, thejunkbond-Treasuryspreadfellquicklythercafterand
within two months of the crash was back to pre crash levels. The commercial
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quickly to its pre crash levels, but the Baa-Treasury spread, SPREADB,
declined more slowly and only reached its pre crash level six months after the
crash.
The fact that the spread variables seem to fit a classic pattern for
financial crises suggests that the October 1987 stock market crash did have the
potential to create major asymmetric information problems in the credit
markets. However, the prompt action by the Fed to perform its lender-of-last
resort role kept the asymmetricinformationproblemfromgettingout of hand,
as is indicated by the moderate increase in the Baa-Treasury spread relative
to earlier financial panics. The failure to enter a recession after the stock
market crash, despite many forecasters predictions along these lines, is
consistent with the view that the Fed's actions prevented the development of
serious asymmetric information problems in the credit markets.
An Overview of the Postwar Episodes
The key fact that emerges from the postwar episodes analyzed here is
that they both display the typical timing patterns in the data visible in the
prewar financial crises, although with a much muted amplitude. This fact
suggests that these episodes did have the potential to create a major
disturbance to the credit markets by substantially increasing asymmetric
information problems. Furthermore, the smailmagnitude of the effectson the
interest rate spreadvariablessuggeststhat the quick and decisive action by the
Federal Reserve to perform a lender-of-last resort role prevented more
serious asymmetric information disturbances to the credit markets which
couldhavehad significant adverse consequences for the aggregate economy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The asymmetric information approach to financial crises explains the
timing patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are
otherwise hard to explain. It also suggestswhy financial crises have had such
important consequencesfor the aggregate economy over the past one hundred
and fifty years. The evidence thus seems to favor an asymmetric information
view of financial crises over a monetarist view.35
However. the asymmetric information approach can be viewed as
complementary to the monetarist view of financial crises since it provides an
important transmission mechanism for how banking panics and monetary
disturbances affect aggregate economic activity.Yet. the asymmetric
informationapproachdoesnotvie—bankingpanicsandmoneysupplydeclines
as the only financial disturbances that can have serious adverse effects on the
aggregate economy. Financial crises have effects over and above those
resulting from banking panics and analysis of such episodes as the stock
market collapse in the 1937-38 period suggests that afinancial crisiswhich has
serious adverse consequences for the economy can develop even if there is no
threat to the banking system. The asymmetric information approach also
suggests that financial disturbances outside of the banking system in the
postwar period have had the potential to have serious adverse effects on the
aggregateeconomy.
This analysis in this paper suggests that there could be benefits to a
lender-of-last-resort role for the central bank to provide liquidity to
nonbanking sectors of the financial system in which asymmetric information
problems have developed. However, there are also potential costs to such an
expanded lender-of-last-resort role since it might encourage too much risk
taking on the part of nonfinancial corporations. There are thuscomplex issues
in deciding whether an expanded lender-of-last-resort role will on the whole
be beneficial and how it should be executed. This is a topic that I plan to
pursue in further research.36
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